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Note
"Shh! Maybe in My Backyard!" An Equity and
Efficiency-Based Critique of SEC Environmental
Disclosure Rules and Extraterritorial
Environmental Matters
Robert J. Lewis
WORLDMINE, Inc., a U.S.-based nickel mining company, operates
identical tailings ponds at mining sites in six countries: the United
States and Countries A through E. The United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) notified WORLDMINE that its sites in the
United States and Country A' stand in violation of the Clean Air Act 2
and the Clean Water Act.3 WORLDMINE estimates that its total pol-
lution control expenditures to remedy these violations will fall within a
$700 million to $1 billion range for its U.S. site.4 Countries B and C
have similarly notified WORLDMINE that its sites in those countries
1. See infra note 93 (addressing the extraterritorial application of U.S.
environmental laws).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The Clean Air Act
mandates that the EPA establish primary and secondary "national ambient air
quality standards" (NAAQSs) for various pollutants. § 7409. The States must
develop "state implementation plans" (SIPs) which impose specific emissions
limitations on various sources of air pollution. §§ 7407, 7410. WORLDMINE's
host state therefore has set limits below WORLDMINE's current emissions. Af-
ter issuing a Notification of Violation (NOV) to both the host state and the vio-
lating party, § 7413(a), the EPA has authority to seek civil fines up to $25,000
per day of violation, § 7413(b), and criminal penalties, including imprisonment
and fines up to $1,000,000. § 7413(c)(5)(A).
3. Federal Water Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992). The Clean Water Act requires, inter alia, that the EPA promulgate efflu-
ent limitations guidelines and new source performance standards for various
classes of waste discharges into rivers, streams, and other bodies of water.
§§ 1312-1313. After issuing an order for compliance, § 1319(a), the EPA has
authority to seek civil fines up to $25,000 for each violation, § 1319(d), and
criminal penalties, including imprisonment and fines up to $25,000 per day for
negligent violations and $50,000 for subsequent violations. § 1319(c)(1). These
fines increase up to $100,000 and $1,000,000 for knowing violations and know-
ing endangerment, respectively. § 1319(c)(2)-(3).
4. Cf In re United States Steel Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 16,223,
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,319, at 82,376,
82,379 (Sept. 27, 1979) (detailing U.S. Steel's compliance cost estimates for
compliance with the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act totalling $700 million
to $1 billion).
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violate their respective environmental regulations. Both countries'
regulations are substantively equivalent to the Clean Air Act and
Clean Water Act.5 Whereas Country B vigorously enforces its regula-
tions, however, Country C rarely pursues enforcement. 6 Country D
has also notified WORLDMINE of violations, but that nation's environ-
mental provisions, when enforced, impose only nominal fines. 7 Coun-
try E has no environmental laws or regulations. 8 WORLDMINE seeks
your counsel in meeting the Securities and Exchange Commission's
(SEC) disclosure requirements.
The introductory hypothetical raises the issue of disclosure obli-
gations concerning extraterritorial environmental matters. The
Securities Act of 19339 and the Securities Exchange Act of
193410 grant the SEC broad discretion to promulgate rules1
that obligate companies 12 to meet exacting disclosure require-
ments associated with the registration and sale of securities,' 3
as well as annual and periodic reports. 14 The Commission
5. See infra note 100 (noting foreign regulations comparable to U.S.
regulations).
6. See infra note 115 (noting jurisdictions with weak enforcement of envi-
ronmental provisions).
7. See infra note 127 (noting countries with environmental regulations
imposing nominal burdens on violators).
8. See infra note 133 (noting countries with little or no environmental reg-
ulatory regime).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. 15 U.S.C. §9 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11. See § 77s(a) (authorizing the SEC to promulgate such rules "as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter"); § 78w(a) (authorizing
rulemaking "as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of
this chapter for which [the SEC is] responsible or for the execution of the func-
tions vested in [it] by this chapter").
12. Throughout this Note, the Author uses the terms "company" and "regis-
trant" interchangably. The application of the SEC's regulations extends both to
the ongoing reports of publicly held companies, see infra note 14, and registra-
tion statements, see infra note 13. See Gerard A. Caron, Comment, SEC Disclo-
sure Requirements for Contingent Environmental Liability, 14 B.C. EmVrL. AFF.
L. REV. 729, 729 n.1 (1987).
13. See § 77g (registration statements); § 77j (prospectuses).
14. See § 78m (periodic and other reports); § 78n (proxies); § 78q (records
and reports). Issuers of regulated securities must file annual and quarterly re-
ports. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 13a-13 (1993). Indeed, the scope of Regulation S-
K, which sets forth current uniform disclosure rules, includes:
(1) Registration statements under the [1933] Securities Act...; and (2)
Registration statements... annual or other reports... annual reports
to security holders and proxy and information statements under the
[1934 Securities] Exchange Act... and any other documents required
to be filed under the Exchange Act ....
Id. at § 229.10(a)(1)-(2).
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has extended this obligation to include environmental disclo-
sures.15
Companies have wrestled with the SEC's attempts to clarify
these environmental disclosure obligations for two decades, and
a few registrants have acknowledged proliferating extraterrito-
rial matters.1 6 Recently, however, the Commission has voiced
concern about the accuracy and completeness of environmental
disclosures, and threatened administrative action.1 7 Due to the
substantial liability attached to actions predicated on inade-
quate disclosures,18 it behooves companies and their counsel to
evaluate extraterritorial environmental matters in light of the
SEC's disclosure regulations.
This Note argues that current SEC disclosure rules require
companies to report only certain overseas environmental mat-
15. The SEC has made this duty explicit in its regulations, see 17 C.F.R.§§ 229.101(c)(xii), 229.103 (1993), as well as implicit, see Management's Discus-
sion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Exchange
Act Release Nos. 33-6835, 34-26,831 (May 18, 1989), 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427,
22,430 (1989) [hereinafter MD & A Release] (acknowledging the application of
17 C.F.R. § 229.303 to environmental matters); Staff Accounting Bulletin, Topic
5: Miscellaneous Accounting, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 74,141, at 64,282-85
(June 16, 1993) (addressing environmental disclosures with respect to financial
statements).
16. See, e.g., DOLE FOOD Co., 10-K REPORT 5 (Jan. 2, 1993) (signed Apr. 1,
1993) (stating that Dole operates within a broad range of evolving regulatory
schemes, and that compliance with current foreign and domestic environmental
laws presents no material effect upon Dole's business operations, but that "fu-
ture developments, such as increasingly strict environmental laws and enforce-
ment policies thereunder," may increase compliance costs); HomSTAKE MNMNG
Co., 10-K REPORT 31 (Dec. 31, 1992) (signed Mar. 26, 1993) (describing gener-
ally environmental matters in connection with Homestake subsidiary's Cana-
dian operations); see also KPMG PEAT MARWICK, 1993 INTERNATioNAL SURVEY
OF E rmomINTAL REPORTING 5-17 (1993) (assessing generally companies' dis-
closures of environmental matters).
The Author's inclusion of these corporations' reports does not indicate a
belief that these corporations' disclosure statements are inadequate. To the
contrary, the Author commends these corporations for their recognition of ex-
traterritorial environmental matters.
17. See Richard Y. Roberts, Emphasis on Environmental Disclosure, 53
ALA. LAw. 262, 264-65 (1992) (noting increased pressure on SEC to monitor the
adequacy of registrant's disclosures); Lee Berton, SEC Rule Forces More Disclo-
sure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1993, at B1, B3 (noting that "[i]nadequate disclosure
is rampant" and quoting SEC Commissioner Roberts's threat that the SEC's
enforcement division would "draw ... and quarter" some registrants "for incon-
sistencies and lack of disclosure" about environmental matters); see also David
Lake & John Graham, What Shareholders Will Know, FIN. & TREAsuRY, June
28, 1993, at 5, 5 ("In recent years, the SEC has taken a much more aggressive
approach to calculating the environmental liabilities of public companies.").
18. See infra notes 26-28 & part I.D (describing SEC enforcement actions
and private actions).
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ters, and that these regulations are inconsistent and inequita-
ble, and thereby threaten investment interests. Part I traces
the historical development as well as legal and policy considera-
tions underlying the SEC's current environmental disclosure
rules. Part II applies these rules to the introductory hypotheti-
cal, and Part III critiques the results. Part IV proposes rule
modifications and administrative actions to improve overseas
environmental matter disclosures. This Note concludes that, ab-
sent these modifications by the SEC, companies may arguably
ignore or understate extraterritorial environmental matters and
threaten investors' interests.
I. TWO DECADES OF SEC ENVIRONMENTAL
DISCLOSURES: A REVIEW
On June 8, 1993 the SEC issued a Staff Accounting Bulletin
(SAB) that clarifies a company's environmental matter reporting
obligations in its financial statements. 19 This SAB is the most
recent in a series of SEC actions directed at environmental dis-
closures that began following the passage of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA)20 in 1969. Before reviewing this
history, this Note examines SEC filing requirements and the
role of the materiality requirement.
A. SEC DISCLosuREs, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND THE
MATERIAL1Y REQUIREMENT
The SEC generally requires that companies disclose only
facts that are "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
19. Staff Accounting Bulletin, supra note 15, at 64,282-85; see also infra
notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing the 1993 release).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. HI 1991). NEPA mandates that
the federal government use "all practical means and measures" to protect envi-
ronmental values when administering federal programs. § 4331(a). Agencies
must consider environmental policies outlined in the Act "to the fullest extent
possible," including considering the world-wide and long-term impacts of
agency action. § 4332(F); see also Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356, § 2-2
(1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988) (establishing that the Department
of State and Council on Environmental Quality, in "collaboration with other
interested Federal agencies and other nations," shall exchange information con-
cerning the environment in order to heighten international awareness of envi-
ronmental concerns).
Nevertheless, NEPA's goals are supplementary to existing agency objec-
tives. 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1988). See generally, David Jacoby & Abbie Eremich,
Environmental Liability in the United States of America, in ENVmoNMENTAL
LI ABIury 63, 67-68 (1991) (discussing NEPA).
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for the protection of investors."21 The Commission places pri-
mary emphasis on "the dissemination of information which is or
may be economically significant."22 In deciding what informa-
tion a registrant must disclose, the Commission considers the
benefits and costs that accrue, weighing the interests of the in-
vestor against the disclosure burden placed on registrants.
23
In light of this benefit-cost analysis, the Commission has set
a threshold for most disclosures whereby a company must dis-
close any "material" fact. The Commission defines a fact as "ma-
terial" if a substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable
investor would have viewed its disclosure "as having signifi-
cantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available."24
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77g (Supp. IV 1992); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77j(c), 781(b)(2)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
22. Proposed Environmental Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 5627,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 80,310, at 85,710 (Oct.
14, 1975) [hereinafter Proposed Environmental Disclosures]. The SEC ex-
plained that it would not require disclosure solely to change corporate conduct.
Instead, disclosure facilitates investors' access to relevant, economically signifi-
cant information, thereby assisting the investors to make informed investment
decisions. Id. at 85,710-13.
On this point, the SEC also recognizes NEPA's mandate to incorporate en-
vironmental policy into its administrative actions insofar as that information
has economic relevancy. Cf Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp.
416, 475 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding that the SEC is "empowered to design and
enforce rules and regulations which fulfill its responsibilities under the envi-
ronmental laws and protect the public interest"); Environmental Disclosure Re-
quirements, Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6130 and 34-16224, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 23,507B, at 17,203-4 (Sept. 27, 1979) [hereinafter Environ-
mental Disclosure Requirements] (noting the SEC's mandate under the NEPA
"to consider environmental values" and the SEC's mandate under the securities
laws to protect investors).
23. For example, the SEC has recognized that elaborate environmental dis-
closures are expensive to produce and arguably confuse investors. See, e.g.,
Proposed Amendments to Item 5 of Regulation S-K Regarding Disclosure of
Certain Environmental Proceedings, Securities Act Release No. 6315, [1981
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,867, at 84,286-87 (May 4, 1981)
(discussing benefits and costs to investors and registrants) [hereinafter Disclo-
sure of Environmental Proceedings]; Proposed Environmental Disclosures,
supra note 22, at 85,712-13. The Commission has repeatedly refused to alter its
benefit-cost analysis to place an undue burden on registrants to disclose envi-
ronmental matters. See supra note 20; infra notes 42-45 and accompanying
text (discussing NEPA mandate).
24. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC In-
dus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.405 (1993) (defining the materiality requirement to include all informa-
tion "to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
attach importance in determining whether to purchase the securities regis-
tered"); § 230.408 (1993) (requiring the disclosure of any additional material
information); § 240.14a-9(a) (1993) (listing potential material factors, including
predictions as to specific market values).
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Materiality will "depend at any given time upon a balancing of
both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the
company activity."25
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 describe prohibitions against material misstatements or
omissions. 26 The SEC may commence an enforcement action
against a company that violates these disclosure requirements,
and investors have judicial remedies available which supple-
ment the SEC's enforcement activities.27 With respect to pri-
25. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see also Wielgos v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 517 (7th Cir. 1989) ('"The anticipated magnitude (the
size if the worst happens, multiplied by the probability that it will happen) may
be small even when the total effect could be whopping.").
With respect to facts with determinable magnitudes, notably those that
have occurred or are occurring, this materiality standard requires the relatively
straightforward assessment of the reasonable investor's response to that fact.
See David S. Ruder et al., Disclosure of Environmental Problems, ENVTL.
CouNs., July 15, 1992, at 18, 20. In contrast, future events, including contin-
gent liabilities, may resist quantification.
26. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992): § 77k(a) (prohibit-
ing material misstatements or omissions of material facts in registration state-
ment for distribution of securities); § 771(2) (prohibiting material
misstatements or omissions in prospectus or oral communication used in sale of
securities, whether or not securities are registered); §§ 77q (prohibiting fraudu-
lent transactions in sale of securities) and 77w (prohibiting unlawful represen-
tation in registration statements); § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993)
(prohibiting fraudulent or manipulative statements and other activities in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities); §§ 78c(b), 78w(a)(1); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9 (1993) (prohibiting solicitation of proxies which contain material
misstatements or omissions); § 78r (prohibiting false or misleading statements
in documents filed with SEC).
27. SEC administrative action includes entering cease-and-desist orders
based upon misrepresentations or failure to make required disclosures, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77h-l(a), 78u-3(a) (Supp. IV 1992); and recommending criminal pros-
ecution to the U.S. Attorney General, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1988). The SEC may
also initiate action in the courts, seeking enjoinders to prevent the corporation
from making misstatements. § 77t(b). Should the corporation fail to comply
with an injunction or otherwise violate these Acts, the SEC may then pursue
civil and criminal penalties. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 78u-y3, 78ff (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992); see also Environmental Disclosure Requirements, supra note 22, at
17,203-3 (summarizing that SEC will take enforcement action in instances of
non-compliance with environmental disclosure requirements). See generally
Richard H. Rowe, SEC Review Practices: A Primer, in ADVANCED WORcSHOP ON
PROBLEMS IN SEcuRIEs DIsCLosUREs 1991, at 579, 580-82 (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 737, 1991) (describing the SEC's decision
to review processes).
With respect to private causes of action, see generally Tower C. Snow, Jr. &
Michelle A. Bryan, A Litigation Framework For Analyzing Disclosure Issues, in
ADVANCED WORKSHOP ON PROBLEMS IN SECURTIEs DIsCLOSURES 1991, supra, at
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURES 1051
vate action, corporations face potentially crippling liability
because litigants are often large classes of investors.
28
B. THE EMERGENCE OF CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
In 1971 the SEC issued an interpretive release 29 alerting
businesses that SEC regulations mandate the reporting of cur-
rent environmental compliance costs3 ° and legal proceedings.
3
'
Dissatisfied with registrants' disclosures following this release,
in 1973 the SEC issued a superseding interpretive release3 2 reit-
erating the dichotomy of the 1971 release: reporting of material
compliance costs and legal proceedings.3 3 The 1973 release,
however, extended registrants' disclosure obligations to include
both present and future compliance costs, 34 as well as all envi-
7 (describing myriad of bases for securities class-action litigation). With respect
to environmental matters particularly, see Proposed Environmental Disclo-
sures, supra note 22, at 85,707.
28. Private litigants typically base recovery on the differential in share
price resulting from the misrepresentation or omission as compared to its ex-
pected price. Ruder et al., supra note 25, at 19. Consequently, the large
number of plaintiffs in a class-action suit magnifies even a small differential.
This is not to say that SEC action has no financial impact. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77t(b), 78u-y3 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
29. Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil
Rights, Securities Act Release No. 5170, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 78,150 (July 19, 1971).
30. The SEC required that companies report compliance costs under statu-
tory requirements when compliance "may necessitate significant capital out
lays, may materially affect the earning power of the business, or cause material
changes in registrant's business done or intended to be done." Id. at 80,487-88.
31. All material legal proceedings arising under "federal, state or local" en-
vironmental laws were subject to mandatory disclosure. Id. at 80,488 (empha-
sis added). These laws include the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1988), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, §§ 1251-1387, discussed
supra note 3, and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. III
1991).
The SEC further requested that registrants furnish supplemental informa-
tion on any proceedings omitted from disclosure on the ground that it was not
material. Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and
Civil Rights, supra note 29, at 80,488.
32. Notice of Adoption of Amendments, Securities Act Release No. 5386,
[1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 79,342 (Apr. 20, 1973). The
SEC sought "more meaningful disclosure of certain items pertaining to business
and litigation, and particularly as to the effect upon the issuer's business of
compliance with Federal, State and local laws and regulations relating to the
protection of the environment". Id. at 83,029 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 83,029-31.
34. The SEC again qualified these compliance costs as those accruing
under "Federal, State and local [environmental] provisions." Id. at 83,029 (em-
phasis added). The SEC set the threshold for disclosure of future compliance
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ronmental administrative or judicial proceedings initiated by a
governmental authority, regardless of materiality.35
On May 9, 1973, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. inquired
of the SEC whether the Commission intended to limit the scope
of reporting on environmental matters to those arising only
under federal, state, or local laws.36 The SEC first instructed
that a company should disclose any material compliance costs
arising under any foreign environmental provision.3 7 Next, the
SEC stated that only economically material foreign environmen-
tal proceedings face mandatory disclosure; the 1973 release's
broad disclosure mandate requiring a registrant to report all en-
vironmental proceedings, regardless of materiality, extended
only to proceedings "instituted by governmental entities within
the United States."38
In 1975 the SEC acquiesced to an order of the District Court
for the District of Columbia,39 stemming from litigation initiated
by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC),40 and is-
costs where management has a reasonable basis to believe that the expendi-
tures will have a material effect on the company's expenditures, earnings, or
competitive position. Id.
35. Id. at 80,030. This disclosure requirement extended broadly to all ma-
terial legal proceedings "known to be contemplated by governmental authori-
ties." Id. (quoting Item 12 of Form S-1). The Commission believed that this
broad disclosure requirement would efficiently inform investors and promote
environmental goals. Id. The SEC further reasoned that "administrative or
judicial proceedings arising under any Federal, State or local provision regulat-
ing the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise specifically
relating to the protection of the environment" were not "ordinary routine litiga-
tion incidental to the business," and therefore fell outside the "ordinary routine
litigation" disclosure exception. Id. (emphasis added).
The SEC also required that companies describe individually the factual ba-
sis and relief sought for environmental proceedings, governmental or otherwise,
that are "material to the business or financial condition of the registrant." Id.
This release reduced the standard of economic materiality to include only
claims for damages in excess of ten percent of current assets. Id. The SEC
permitted companies to group similar proceedings not meeting the materiality
criteria under a single, generic description. Id. at 83,030-31.
36. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 79,429, at 83,229, 83,230 (June 11, 1973).
37. Id. at 82,229.
38. Id.
39. See Notice of Commission Conclusions and Final Action on the
Rulemaking Proposals Announced in Securities Act Release No. 5627 (Oct. 14,
1975) Relating to Environmental Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 5704,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,495, at 86,293-94
(May 6, 1976) [hereinafter Rulemaking on Environmental Disclosure]; Pro-
posed Environmental Disclosures, supra note 22, at 85,707.
40. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 693
(D.D.C. 1974) (mem.) (remanding the issue of environmental matter disclosures
1052
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sued a release containing exhaustive policy analysis and addi-
tional proposals regarding environmental disclosures.41 The
Commission recognized that NEPA42 mandated such broad pol-
icy considerations. In addition to the traditional objectives of
federal securities laws-the protection of investors, "the further-
ance of fair, orderly and informed securities markets," and the
fair opportunity for corporate suffrage4 3-NEPA authorized the
SEC to consider the promotion of environmental protection.44
Nonetheless, because federal action under securities laws has
only an indirect effect upon the environment, the SEC concluded
that it would continue to place primary emphasis on the disclo-
sure of economically significant information.45
to the SEC for further rulemaking in light of NEPA's mandate to include con-
sideration of environmental values within agency rulemaking activities), ap-
peal after remand, 432 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1977) (finding SEC in violation of
order), and rev'd, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (sustaining SEC's objections to
required disclosure rules). Indeed, this order represents a midpoint in the
SEC's battle with the NRDC over environmental matter disclosures. The
NRDC first submitted a rulemaking petition to the SEC on July 7, 1971 that
advocated requiring a registrant to disclose the nature and extent of pollution
caused by its activities, the feasibility of clean-up, and the prospects for improv-
ing relevant technology. Rulemaking on Environmental Disclosure, supra note
39, at 86,293. The SEC denied the NRDC's petition, id., and the NRDC twice
brought suit for judicial review unsuccessfully. See National Resources Defense
Council v. SEC, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 94,714
(D.C. Cir. June 17, 1974) (per curium) (dismissing action for lack of jurisdic-
tion); National Resources Defense Council v. SEC, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 93,784 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 8, 1973) (per curium) (mem.)
(denying relief because the SEC had taken no final agency action). The NRDC
won the 1974 district court suit, supra, thereby prompting the 1975 release,
described supra note 39; infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. Following
the SEC's refusal to agree to further revisions of its environmental disclosure
rules, however, the NRDC successfully appealed again to the district court but
lost when the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sided with the Com-
mission. National Resources Defense Council, 606 F.2d at 1036; see also Risa
Vetri Ferman, Note, Environmental Disclosures and SEC Reporting Require-
ments, 17 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 483, 493-95 (1992) (describing NEPA-SEC litigation).
41. Proposed Environmental Disclosures, supra note 22, at 85,706. "[W]e
have today proposed for comment rules which would make available... infor-
mation regarding the extent to which corporations have failed to satisfy envi-
ronmental standards under federal law." Id. at 85,707 (emphasis added).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
43. Proposed Environmental Disclosures, supra note 22, at 85,713.
44. Id. at 85,706.
45. Id. at 85,710, 85,716. The Commission wrote that NEPA "was intended
to permit and require [the SEC] to consider environmental values in the per-
formance of the functions authorized under [its] organic statute[ I." Id. at
85,715.
[Tihe principal, if not the only reason why people invest their money in
securities is to obtain a return. A variety of other motives are probably
present in the investment decisions of numerous investors but the only
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The SEC further honed its environmental disclosure scheme
through the late 1970s, issuing another interpretive release 46 in
1979 in conjunction with an enforcement proceeding against
United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel).4 7 With respect to
environmental compliance costs, this release clarified that a cor-
poration must disclose all known or estimated material capital
expenditures for current and succeeding fiscal years. 48 When
common thread is the hope for a satisfactory return, and it is to this
that a disclosure scheme intended to be useful to all must be primarily
addressed.
Id. at 85,721. The Commission then reiterated its opposition to requiring
"volu[m]inous, subjective and costly" disclosures. Id. at 85,717-18. It continued
to reject a mandate to disclose all pending environmental litigation, and it re-
fused to require companies to disclose their environmental policies. Id. at
85,718-19.
In 1976, the SEC made three minor amendments and clarifications to its
disclosure requirements, but rejected broader proposals that the Commission
take "principal responsibility for substantive regulation of environmental prac-
tices." Rulemaking on Environmental Disclosure, supra note 39, at 86,291-92.
First, the Commission required that compliance cost disclosures include "mate-
rial estimated capital expenditures for environmental control facilities" for the
registrant's current and succeeding fiscal years, and any additional periods that
the registrant may deem material. Id. at 86,294 & n.14; see also Proposed Envi-
ronmental Disclosures, supra note 22, at 85,727 (describing the 1975 proposal
as it applies to "Federal, state or local environmental standards") (emphasis
added).
The SEC then reiterated its requirement that registrants disclose all envi-
ronmental litigation initiated by a governmental authority pursuant to "federal,
state or local provisions." Id. at 86,295 (emphasis added). The Commission
noted that the receipt of a cease and desist order from the EPA would be suffi-
cient to indicate contemplated governmental legal action and to trigger the dis-
closure obligation. Rulemaking on Environmental Disclosure, supra note 39, at
86,297 n.22.
Finally, the SEC added a new disclosure requirement that registrants' fil-
ings must contain "all material information necessary to make the statements
neither false nor misleading[, including] information concerning environmental
compliance, impact, expenditures, plans, or violations, not otherwise specifi-
cally required, of which the average prudent investor ought reasonably to be
informed." Id. at 86,297.
46. Environmental Disclosure Requirements, supra note 22, at 17,203-3.
47. In re United States Steel Corp., supra note 4, at 82,376. In this admin-
istrative action, the SEC found that U.S. Steel had failed to make adequate
disclosure of its estimates of $1.1 to $1.6 billion in environmental expenditures
and its environmental proceedings in ongoing reports filed under the Exchange
Act. Id. at 82,380-81. The Commission also asserted that U.S. Steel had pur-
sued a corporate policy that resisted environmental requirements and thereby
exposed the company to substantial civil and criminal penalties. Id. Without
admitting to these violations, U.S. Steel consented to notify its investors of the
SEC action and to undertake an independent audit to evaluate the company's
compliance with environmental laws. Id. at 82,384-86.
48. Environmental Disclosure Requirements, supra note 22, at 17,203-4
n.11, 17,203-5. Moreover, a registrant's reasonable expectation that future
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURES 1055
reporting administrative proceedings, a company must disclose
all environmental proceedings initiated by either the govern-
ment or the registrant and give an estimated cost for the relief
sought by the government, if material. 49 The Commission also
broadly interpreted "proceedings" to include administrative and
judicial consent orders. 50
C. CuRRENT E v miroi AL DISCLOsuIRE REQUIREMENTS
In an effort to streamline its regulatory regime and to
amend some provisions with which it was dissatisfied, in 1982
the SEC promulgated Regulation S-K which sets forth current
uniform disclosure rules. 5 1 Several provisions explicitly52 and
implicitly53 address environmental matters.
1. Item 101 of Regulation S-K
Item 101 codifies the SEC's efforts to regulate the disclosure
of "the material effects [of] compliance with Federal, State and
local [environmental] provisions . .. upon the capital expendi-
tures, earnings and competitive position of [a] registrant and its
compliance costs will be materially higher than costs disclosed for the current
or succeeding period may create an affirmative duty on the registrant to esti-
mate such costs and to describe the source of such estimates and the extent of
any uncertainty. Id. at 17,203-5; see also Ferman, supra note 40, at 496 & n.91
(noting duty to formulate estimates).
49. Environmental Disclosure Requirements, supra note 22, at 17,203-6.
The SEC stated, "[tihe obligation to disclose is triggered whenever a govern-
mental authority is a party to any proceeding." Id. Government initiated pro-
ceedings include federal, state, and local governmental actions under federal
law. Id. at 17,203-6 & n.14.
50. Id. The Commission stated described that a registrant's request for an
adjudicatory hearing to contest the denial of a permit under the National Pollu-
tion Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program also triggers this
disclosure obligation. Id. at 17,203-6.
The Commission also described two circumstances under which a corpora-
tion must disclose its environmental policy. Id. First, any voluntary disclosure
of environmental policy must be accurate and obligates the corporation to make
supplemental disclosures to avoid being misleading. Id. In addition, a com-
pany must disclose its environmental policy if that policy is "likely to result in
substantial fines, penalties, or other significant effects upon the corporation,"
and the registrant may need to "disclose the likelihood and magnitude of such
fines [and] penalties." Id. at 17,203-6 to 17,203-7.
51. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10-.802 (1993); see also supra note 14 (describing the
scope of Regulation S-K).
52. See infra parts I.C.1 & I.C.2 (describing Items 101 and 103 of Regula-
tion S-K, respectively).
53. See infra part I.C.3 (addressing Item 303); cf part I.C.4 (describing
that Regulation S-X implicitly addresses environmental matters).
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subsidiaries."5 4 This Item also continues the SEC's mandate
that companies disclose their material estimated capital expend-
itures related to environmental compliance for current and suc-
ceeding fiscal periods.55
2. Item 103 of Regulation S-K
Item 103, the second provision that incorporates explicit
language on environmental disclosures, sets forth the SEC's dis-
closure requirements concerning legal proceedings. 56 A regis-
trant must report any material pending or contemplated legal
proceedings, except "ordinary routine litigation incidental to
business."57 Item 103's Instruction 5 eliminates this exception
for all administrative or judicial proceedings "arising under any
Federal, State or local [environmental] provisions."58
Instruction 5 sets out three criteria under which a regis-
trant must describe such a proceeding.59 First, a description is
necessary if the proceeding is material to the registrant's busi-
ness or financial condition.60 In addition, the registrant must
describe any proceeding involving a claim in excess of ten per-
54. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (1993) (emphasis added). Item 101 also sets
forth disclosure obligations concerning foreign and domestic operations and ex-
port sales. § 229.101(d). Item 101(d) requires a registrant to describe "[any
risks attendant to its foreign operations," unless the registrant chooses to de-
scribe this matter under an alternative heading, such as environmental mat-
ters. § 229.101(d)(2) (emphasis added); see also § 229.303(a), Instruction 11
(mandating foreign private registrants to discuss governmental, economic, fis-
cal, monetary, or political policies or factors that have had a material effect on
their business operations).
55. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii); cf supra notes 45, 48 and accompanying text
(describing compliance costs as addressed in the 1976 and 1979 releases).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1993).
57. § 229.103; see also Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509,
516-18 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming the district court's holding that Common-
wealth Edison met Item 103's disclosure requirements concerning the material-
ity of pending Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensure for several nuclear
power facilities, without deciding whether application for such licensure consti-
tuted a "routine" proceeding).
58. § 229.103, Instruction 5 (1993) (emphasis added). The omission of any
language limiting disclosure to only those actions initiated by governmental au-
thorities or the registrant suggests that the SEC intended broad disclosure re-
quirements. Cf Notice of Adoption of Amendments, supra note 32, at 83,030
(applying to government initiated proceedings); Environmental Disclosure Re-
quirements, supra note 22, at 17,203-6 (expanding proceedings to include regis-
trant-initiated proceedings).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, Instruction 5 (1993).
60. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, Instruction 5(A) (1993); cf Notice of Adoption of
Amendments, supra note 32, at 83,030 (employing the same language).
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cent of the registrant's current consolidated assets. 6' Finally,
the SEC mandates a description of all proceedings involving a
governmental authority unless the registrant reasonably be-
lieves that monetary sanctions will not exceed $100,000.62
3. Item 303 of Regulation S-K
Item 303,63 setting forth disclosure obligations in Manage-
ment's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Re-
sults of Operations (MD&A) in SEC filings,64 makes no explicit
reference to environmental matters. This Item requires a regis-
trant to discuss its liquidity, capital resources, and "results of
operations," as well as any other information the registrant be-
lieves is "necessary to an understanding of its financial condi-
tion" and changes in its financial condition.65 Management is to
discuss any retrospective 66 or forward-looking6 7 information,
61. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, Instruction 5(B) (1993); cf Proposed Environmen-
tal Disclosures, supra note 22, at 85,718 (mandating the disclosure of proceed-
ings if amounts exceed ten percent of consolidated assets); Notice of Adoption of
Amendments, supra note 32, at 83,030 (defining economic materiality as ten
percent of assets).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, Instruction 5(C) (1993); see also Disclosure of En-
vironmental Proceedings, supra note 23, at 84,289 (explaining that registrant
must have a reasonable belief at the time of disclosure and must reevaluate
that belief in connection with future filings), supra note 49 and accompanying
text (discussing administrative proceedings). This third criterion departs from
the obligation under prior releases to disclose all proceedings to which the gov-
ernment was a party, regardless of materiality in that it sets a $100,000 eco-
nomic threshold for materiality. The SEC determined that the older, broader
provision failed to accomplish its intended results because registrants could ob-
scure significant environmental proceedings with lengthy descriptions of rela-
tively inconsequential ones and thereby complicate investor and administrative
review of business operations. Disclosure of Environmental Proceedings, supra
note 23, at 84,287. Instruction 5(C) also allows the registrant to aggregate sim-
ilar proceedings under generic descriptions. § 229.103, Instruction 5(C).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1993).
64. The Commission requires issuers of regulated securities to file annual
and quarterly reports. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308(a)-.310 (1993). Forms 10-K and 10-
Q require, inter alia, an MD&A. See 45 Fed. Reg. 63,641 (Sept. 25, 1980), as
amended, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,321 (Mar. 13, 1989) (10-K Form); 46 Fed. Reg. 12,487
(Feb 17, 1981), as amended, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,472 (Mar. 16, 1982), as amended,
54 Fed. Reg. 10,320 (Mar. 13, 1989) (10-Q Form) (describing form contents).
65. § 229.303(a).
66. § 229.303(a)(3)(i). The regulation states: "Describe any unusual or in-
frequent events or transactions or any significant economic changes that mate-
rially affected the amount of reported income from continuing operations and,
in each case, indicate the extent to which income was so affected." Id.
67. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). This regulation requires that the registrant
"[d]escribe any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the regis-
trant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact
on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations." Id.
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and is to pay particular attention to information "that would
cause reported financial information not to be necessarily indic-
ative of future operating results or of future financial
condition."68
In 1989, the SEC issued an interpretive release69 that expli-
cates a two prong test to determine MD&A disclosure obliga-
tions and illustrates Item 303's application to environmental
matters.70 First, the company must decide whether a "known
trend, demand, commitment, event, or uncertainty [is reason-
ably] likely come to fruition."71 If management can prove that
there is not a reasonable likelihood, it need not disclose the mat-
ter.72 Then, if management cannot make such a negative deter-
mination, it must assume that the trend, demand, commitment,
event, or uncertainty will occur.7 3 Given this assumption, Item
303 then requires disclosure unless a "material effect on the reg-
istrant's financial condition or results of operations is not rea-
sonably likely to occur."74
68. § 229.303(a), Instruction 3.
69. MD&A Release, supra note 15, at 22,427.
70. In setting forth this test, the SEC first drew a sharp distinction be-
tween required and voluntary prospective information. Id. at 22,429. The SEC
requires a registrant to predict the impact of "known trends, events and uncer-
tainties," and asks that a registrant volunteer information involving "anticipat-
ing a future trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known
event, trend or uncertainty." Id. With regard to required prospective informa-
tion involving known trends, demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties,
the SEC established the two prong test. See infra notes 71-74. Furthermore,
the SEC's safe harbor rules apply to both the required prospective disclosures
and voluntary forward-looking projections. MD&A Release, supra note 15, at
22,429. The safe harbor provisions protect registrants from liability from for-
ward looking statements, unless such statements are "made or reaffirmed with-
out a reasonable basis or [are] disclosed other than in good faith." 17 C.F.R.§§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (1993); see also Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892
F.2d 509, 512-16 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing safe harbors); Ferman, supra note
40, at 488-89, 501-02 (discussing safe harbors).
71. MD&A Release, supra note 15, at 22,430.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The SEC illustrated this two part test with an example involving a
company that the EPA had correctly designated as a potentially responsible
party (PRP), under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992), with respect to clean-up costs at three hazardous waste sites. MD&A
Release, supra note 15, at 22,430. The hypothetical assumed that management
could not determine that a material effect on the future financial condition of
the company was not reasonably likely to occur. Id. Consequently, Item 303
required the company to report "the effects of the PRP status, quantified to the
extent reasonably practicable." Id.
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4. Regulation S-X
Regulation S-X governs registrants' accounting presenta-
tions.7 5 The SEC staff recently interpreted the current account-
ing literature to guide registrants' disclosure of environmental
contingencies in accounting presentations.7 6 Recognizing that
the risks and uncertainties adhering to material contingent en-
vironmental liabilities are separate from those associated with a
registrant's claim for recovery from third parties, the SEC now
requires that a registrant independently evaluate environmen-
tal liability expenditures and claims for recovery.77 In addition,
management may not delay reporting of liabilities, despite un-
certainty, but should recognize the minimum amount of the ex-
pected range of liability.78
D. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDIcIAL ACTIONS
In addition to issuing the 1989 and 1993 releases, the Com-
missioners have made recent public statements urging compa-
nies to make broad environmental disclosures in compliance
75. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to 210.12-30 (1993). Specifically, Regulation
S-X sets forth the form and content for financial statements filed as part of
registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77bbbb (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and registration statements, annual and other
reports, and proxy and information statements under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 78a-7811; 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01(a)(1), (a)(2) (1993).
76. The SEC staff based its instructions on ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGEN-
cIEs, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1975) [hereinafter FASB 5]. See Staff Accounting Bulletin,
supra note 15 at 64,282. Paragraph 8 of FASB 5 requires that a registrant
accrue an "estimated loss from a loss contingency... by a charge to income" if it
is probable that the registrant has incurred a liability and the registrant can
reasonably estimate the loss. FASB 5, supra, S 8. Further, if one or both of
these conditions does not hold, the registrant must disclose the contingency
when "there is at least a reasonable possibility that [the registrant incurred] a
loss..." Id. S 10; see also Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Lia-
bilities Under the Securities Laws: The Potential of Securities-Market-Based In-
centives for Pollution Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093, 1119-24 (1993)
(discussing financial statement disclosure of environmental liabilities).
77. Staff Accounting Bulletin, supra note 15, at 64,282. Only if a claim for
recovery is probable of realization may the registrant reduce any loss arising
from the recognition of environmental liability by the expected value of the
claim. Id. at 64,282 & n.1 (defining "probable" as "likely to occur"). Conversely,
if it is probable that other responsible parties will not pay, and the liability will
consequently fall on the registrant, the registrant must include its best esti-
mate of total expected payment. Id. at 64,283.
78. Id. In discussing the relevant factors in measuring liabilities, the SEC
argues that "minimum clean-up costs [are] unlikely to be zero." Id.
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with SEC regulations.79 The SEC has also established a close
alliance with the EPA to assist with monitoring environmental
disclosures.8 0
Recent rhetoric notwithstanding, the SEC has only infre-
quently challenged a registrant's environmental disclosures.8 '
79. As SEC Commissioner Richard Roberts, head of the SEC's environmen-
tal portfolio, recently commented:
Vigorous enforcement of environmental laws is likely to occur in the
next decade.... Liabilities could be devastating, serious enough to
bring down many public companies. Disclosure is being dealt with, yet
the liabilities are not quantified or reflected as quickly as they should
be in the financial statements. Face it. If you are a [Potentially Re-
sponsible Party under CERCLA], you can be sure the liability is
material.
Lake & Graham, supra note 17, at 5; see also Wallace, supra, note 76, at 1099-
1100 (suggesting that the sizable liabilities associated with the environmental
matters Roberts mentioned the form the rationale for the SEC's recent in-
creased environmental emphasis).
80. The EPA will send to the SEC its lists of Potentially Responsible Par-
ties (PRPs) under CERCLA, data on cleanup requirements under the Resource
Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA), lists of criminal and civil proceedings, and
information on companies barred from governmental contracts under the Clean
Air Act and Clean Water Act. The SEC will then use this information to assess
registrants' disclosures. See Mark A. Stach, Disclosure of Existing and Contin-
gent Superfund Liability Under the Reporting Requirements of the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 18 U. DAYTON L. REv. 355, 356-57 (1993) (describing SEC and
EPA cooperation in light of the SEC's recent emphasis on forward-looking dis-
closures); Wallace, supra note 76, at 1099-1100 (describing SEC-EPA dialogue).
81. This is not to say that the SEC has not pursued informal investigations
into registrants' environmental disclosures. See Berton, supra note 17, at B3
(naming companies that admit to receiving informal inquiries from the SEC).
Private actions predicated on a corporation's failure to meet SEC environ-
mental disclosure requirements have increased in number in recent years, and
have encountered mixed results. Compare Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Al-
len & Co., Inc., 993 F.2d 578, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that claim for
recision of private resale of stock could proceed when plaintiffs alleged the sell-
ers made erroneous representations that battery manufacturer and subsidiar-
ies complied with environmental laws), cert. granted on other grounds, 1994
U.S. LEXIS 1316 (U.S. 1994) and Endo v. Albertine, 812 F. Supp. 1479, 1486-88
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting summary judgment against plaintiffs claims based on
defendant's failure to disclose contingent environmental liabilities stemming
from a former subsidiary's operations) and Grossman v. Waste Management,
Inc., 589 F. Supp 395, 408-09 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (denying defendant's summary
judgment motion in civil fraud action for failure to disclose that corporation was
running the risk of violating environmental laws) with Levine v. NL Indus.,
Inc., 926 F.2d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing action in which U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy promised to indemnify the defendant against its subsidiary's
environmental liabilities, thus making the liabilities non-material) and Crouse-
Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 474 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (dis-
missing claim for failure to assert that defendant misstated or omitted material
fact concerning environmental liabilities).
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One judicial action, SEC v. Allied Chemical Corp.,8 2 and two ad-
ministrative actions, In re United States Steel Corp.83 and In re
Occidental Petroleum Corp.,84 all led to consent decrees in which
the subject corporation agreed to develop a comprehensive envi-
ronmental audit program.
Interestingly, the SEC also commented upon Occidental's
failure to disclose certain non-environmental risks associated
with the corporation's overseas operations, 8 5 thereby confirming
that the Commission's reporting requirements extend to over-
seas operations.8 6 Indeed, the SEC revisited foreign operations
disclosures in a 1992 enforcement release describing non-envi-
ronmental MD&A reporting violations by Caterpillar, Inc.8 7
82. No. 77-373, 1977 SEC LEXIS 2280, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 1977). The
SEC charged that Allied knew of the adverse effects that its discharge of toxic
chemicals had on animal and marine life, but failed to report the resulting ma-
terial contingent liabilities from companies, individuals, and state and local
governments. Id. at *1-*2; Chemical Company Enjoined for Failure to Disclose
Pollution's Potential Impact, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 393, at A-17 to A-18
(Mar. 9, 1977).
In addition to requiring Allied to perform an internal environmental audit
and to report its findings to the SEC, the consent agreement also permanently
enjoined Allied from further violations of the securities laws anti-fraud and re-
porting provisions. The agreement also obligated Allied to provide information
to the SEC with respect to its current environmental policies, practices, and
procedures for informing company management of material environmental
risks and uncertainties associated with the company's operations. SEC v. Al-
lied Chem. Corp., 1977 SEC LEXIS 2280, at *2.
83. See supra note 47 (discussing U.S. Steel action).
84. Exchange Act Release No. 16,950, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 82,622, at 83,346 (July 2, 1980). Occidental had failed to report
the effect of environmental compliance on its capital expenditures. Id. at
83,349. The corporation also failed to disclose the nature of environmental vio-
lations, environmental liabilities, and pending and contemplated proceedings.
Id. at 83,348-49. The SEC settlement with Occidental required that the com-
pany institute an environmental audit to better inform management of environ-
mental matters affecting its business operations. Id. at 83,356-57.
85. According to the SEC, Occidental failed to disclose economic risks asso-
ciated with a refinery in the Unted Kingdom and the extent of Occidental's dis-
pute with the Libyan government following the nationalization of its facilities
in Libya. Id. at 83,353-55.
86. See also 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(d) (1993), discussed supra note 54
(describing disclosure requirements).
87. In re Caterpillar, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, 7
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 73,830, at 63,050, 63,055 (Mar. 31, 1992). Caterpillar
had failed to disclose information about the 1989 earnings of its Brazilian sub-
sidiary and known uncertainties about the subsidiary's 1990 projected earn-
ings. Id. at 63,051. Due to known turmoil in the Brazilian economy,
Caterpillar's management could not reasonably believe that a material effect on
Caterpillar's operations was not likely to occur from lower earnings. Id. at
63,055.
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This review of the SEC's disclosure regulations reveals sig-
nificant administrative interest in extending the reporting of
economically relevant investment information to include envi-
ronmental matters. Recognizing that NEPA's mandate elevates
the importance of environmental matters disclosures, the SEC
nonetheless exhibits a reluctance to take regulatory action pred-
icated solely on an intent to alter corporate attitudes toward the
environment. Instead, the Commission addresses environmen-
tal matters within the context of their economic impact, as ac-
crued through compliance costs (Item 101) and proceedings
(Item 103), and generally (Item 303 and Regulation S-X).
II. SEC ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE RULES AND
THE HYPOTHETICAL
This section applies the forgoing disclosure rules to the in-
troductory hypothetical in order to lay the foundation for illus-
trating flaws in the SEC's current disclosure regime. Table 1
summarizes the results.
TABLE 1. WORLDMINE'S SEC DISCLOSURE
OBLIGATIONS, SITES IN UNITED STATES AND
COUNTRIES A THROUGH E
Country SitesCountry Country Country Country Country
United States A B C D E
Item 101 (Compliance Costs) D D N?) N(?) N(?) N
Item 103 (Proceedings) D D(?) N(?) N?) N N
MD&A:
Compliance Costs D D D D D N
Proceedings D D D D N N
Financial Statements:
Compliance Costs D D D D(?) D(?) N
Proceedings D D D NC?) N(?) N
Key: D = Disclosure; N = Nondisclosure.
Evaluating WORLDMINE's disclosure obligations with re-
spect to its U.S. site provides a basis for comparison to its obliga-
tions concerning the company's extraterritorial sites. First,
Item 101 of Regulation S-K requires that WORLDMINE disclose
its material estimated capital expenditures for pollution control
at the U.S. site.88 The company must disaggregate and describe
its $700 million to $1 billion estimate according to current and
88. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (1993).
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succeeding fiscal year expenditures, in addition to disclosing any
future expected costs included in this estimate.8 9 In addition,
Instruction 5 of Item 103, mandating the disclosure of all mate-
rial pending or contemplated environmental proceedings, com-
pels WORLDMINE to report the EPA's notice of violation.90
Finally, because the compliance costs and proceedings represent
material current or contingent expenditures, WORLDMINE
must report both in its MD&A91 and financial statements.92
A. SEC DISCLOSURES AND WORLDMINE's CovwTRYA SiTE
WORLDMINE's second site faces EPA action pursuant to
the extraterritorial application of United States environmental
laws.93 Because Item 101 requires WORLDMINE to report ma-
terial estimated compliance costs, the company must first esti-
89. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii); Environmental Disclosure Requirements, supra
note 22, at 17,203-5. These costs arise through compliance with federal envi-
ronmental provisions and are material; indeed, this author knows of no corpora-
tion for which expenditures approaching $1 billion are not material.
90. The EPA's Notice of Violation meets the SEC's broad definition of "pro-
ceeding." See Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 412
(N.D. Il1. 1984) (holding that "defendant had an affirmative duty to disclose
matters relating to pending and contemplated environmental regulatory pro-
ceedings"); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 474-75
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) (comparing factual basis for suit in which the regulatory
agency had made no determination of environmental liability to that in the SEC
enforcement action against Occidental Petroleum Corp. in which the EPA had
found liability); see also Environmental Disclosure Requirements, supra note
22, at 17,203-6 (describing the SEC's broad interpretation of "proceeding");
Rulemaking on Environmental Disclosure, supra note 39, at 86,297 n.22 (noting
that the receipt of a cease and desist order from the EPA is sufficient to indicate
contemplated governmental legal action).
This proceeding meets all three thresholds for disclosure described in In-
struction 5. For example, a description is necessary under Instruction 5(C) be-
cause the EPA could easily assess fines exceeding $100,000. See supra notes 2-
3 (describing the magnitude of fines that the EPA may charge for failure to
comply with environmental laws); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text
(noting that Item 103's Instruction 5(C) compels the reporting of government
proceedings in excess of $100,000).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) & Instruction 3 (1993); see supra notes 69-74
and accompanying text (describing the MD&A Release).
92. Staff Accounting Bulletin, supra note 15, at 64,282-83; see supra notes
75-78 and accompanying text (describing financial statement reporting).
93. This Note recognizes that the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. envi-
ronmental laws is highly suspect, but includes this wrinkle to tease out addi-
tional nuances in the disclosure requirements. Cf. Carl F. Schwenker, Note,
Protecting the Environment and U.S. Competitiveness in the Era of Free Trade:
A Proposal, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1355, 1389-1403 (1993) (proposing that the United
States take unilateral regulatory action to apply U.S. environmental laws
outside the territorial limits of the United States through a Foreign Environ-
mental Pollution Prevention Act).
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mate the compliance costs.94 In light of the estimates in the
United States, it is likely that compliance costs in Country A will
be material, thereby obligating disclosure. WORLDMINE must
also disaggregate these costs by current and succeeding years
and any additional years, if material. 95 Similarly, Item 103's
requirement that WORLDMINE disclose all material environ-
mental proceedings arising under federal, state, or local provi-
sions, extends to the EPA's notice of violation in Country A.96
Accepting the materiality of the compliance costs and the
contingent materiality of the proceedings, WORLDMINE should
disclose both in its MD&A. The compliance costs will come to
fruition, thereby satisfying the first prong of the MD&A disclo-
sure test.97 Although WORLDMINE may be unsure whether
the EPA will assess fines, pursuant to the second prong of the
MD&A test, WORLDMINE must disclose the proceedings be-
cause, if imposed, the fines will be material. 98 WORLDMINE
should also disclose its material disaggregated compliance esti-
mates for Country A and the factors considered in deriving those
estimates in its financial statements. 99
94. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (1993). This may require WORLD-
MINE to consider, inter alia, currency exchange rates, labor cost differentials,
and the local availability of clean-up technology.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (1993); see also supra notes 88-89 and accompany-
ing text (describing Item 101 disclosure obligations at WORLDMINE's U.S.
site).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, Instruction 5 (1993). The action involves a gov-
ernmental agency, thereby triggering Instruction 5(C), and given the size of
fines under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, see supra notes 2-3,
WORLDMINE cannot reasonably believe that sanctions will not be greater
than $100,000. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, Instruction 5(C) (1993).
The SEC's instructions in its 1973 No-Action Letter to Air Products and
Chemicals, Inc., supra note 36, at 83,229, stipulating that the broad disclosure
requirements covering nonmaterial environmental proceedings apply only to
those instituted by governmental entities "within the United States", id., are
ambiguous. It remains unclear whether this quoted language limits application
to only U.S.-based governmental agency's action (the language modifies "gov-
ernmental entities"), actions begun only within the United States (the language
modifies "proceedings"), or only those proceedings involving sites within the
United States (the language describes the location of the site). Id. If the SEC
intended either of the first two interpretations, then disclosure of the proceed-
ing concerning the site in Country A is mandatory, regardless of economic mate-
riality. If the Commission intended the third, then the EPA action must be
economically material to compel disclosure.
97. See MD&A Release, supra note 15, at 22,430 (describing test).
98. See id.
99. Staff Accounting Bulletin, supra note 15, at 64,284 (interpreting Regu-
lation S-X as applied to environmental matters).
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B. SEC DISCLOSURES AND WORLDMINE's CouTNTRYB SITE
Although the site in Country B is subject to environmental
laws and regulations substantively equivalent to United States
regulations,100  WORLDMINE's disclosure obligations only
partly parallel those for its United States and Country A sites.
For example, WORLDMINE's Item 101 obligations are ambigu-
ous. An estimation of compliance costs similar to that in Coun-
try A would likely suggest that WORLDMINE's compliance costs
in Country B are material.10 1 One might expect this result to
trigger disclosure under Item 101.102 The language, however, of
Item 101 relating to environmental matters mandates disclo-
sure of material compliance costs associated with "Federal, State
and local provisions."103 Hence, a close reading suggests that
WORLDMINE need not report the compliance costs associated
with its tailings pond in Country B as these costs accrue through
compliance with foreign provisions.
Alternatively, pursuant to the SEC's 1973 instructions con-
cerning foreign environmental matters, 10 4 WORLDMINE must
report compliance costs in Country B because they will have a
material impact on WORLDMINE's business operations.,0 5 The
authority of the 1973 instructions is, however, in doubt. The
SEC has not incorporated these instructions into any subse-
quent release on environmental compliance cost reporting.10 6
Because Regulation S-K supersedes earlier disclosure regula-
100. See, e.g., Canada Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C., ch. C-15.3,§§ 113-114 (1989) (Can.) (imposing fines up to CAN$1,000,000 and criminal
sanctions for fraud or failure to comply with Canada's environmental regula-
tions involving air and water quality); Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C.
ch. E-19, §§ 193(2), (4) (1990) (Ont.) (imposing fines on corporations up to
CAN$200,000 per day for failure to comply with, and up to CAN$1,000,000 if
adverse effects result from violations of, air and water quality standards pursu-
ant to Ontario's environmental protection laws); Tae Hee Lee, Environmental
Law of South Korea, in NTERNATIONAL EirmoiE-TA LA-w AND REGULATION
S.Kor-1, § 3.2 (J. Andrew Schlickman et al. eds., 1992) (describing civil and
criminal sanctions up to 15 million Won applicable to violations of nearly all of
South Korea's environmental regulations and noting South Korea's environ-
mental regulators' improvement order powers and resources for enforcement).
101. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing estimation of
compliance costs for WORLDMINE's Country A site).
102. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (1993).
103. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii).
104. See Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., supra note 36, at 83,229.
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 32, 34, 41, 45, 54 and accompanying text (quoting SEC
releases' language inclusive only of compliance costs arising under federal,
state and local environmental provisions).
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tions,1°7 and because the 1973 No-Action Letter arguably re-
lates only to the 1973 release, WORLDMINE may again
conclude that current regulations do not require disclosing com-
pliance costs in Country B under Item 101.
WORLDMINE encounters a similar problem under Item
103. WORLDMINE must disclose any material proceedings in
Country B "known to be contemplated by governmental authori-
ties."108 That Country B notified WORLDMINE of its noncom-
pliance is sufficient to show that Country B is contemplating
proceedings. 0 9 WORLDMINE, however, might construe Coun-
try B's action as "ordinary routine litigation" 0 and thereby ex-
clude it from disclosure."'L Furthermore, Item 103's Instruction
5 is inapplicable because that Instruction eradicates the "ordi-
nary routine litigation" exception only for those material pro-
ceedings "arising under any Federal, State or local provi-
sions.""32 Hence, because Country B's proceeding arises under a
foreign provision, WORLDMINE may utilize the "ordinary rou-
tine litigation" loophole and elect not to describe the proceeding.
WORLDMINE's MD&A disclosures concerning the Country
B site should include reporting of compliance costs and proceed-
ings as they are material and likely to come to fruition."13 Fur-
thermore, WORLDMINE must disclose and describe its mate-
rial compliance costs, expected material fines, uncertainties, and
estimation factors in its financial statements pursuant to Regu-
lation S-X."' 4
107. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (1993); Wallace, supra note 76, at 1105 (stating
that Regulation S-K supersedes prior releases).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1993).
109. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing broad interpreta-
tion of "proceeding" in relation to WORLDMINE's U.S. site).
110. § 229.103.
111. See § 229.103 (describing "ordinary routine litigation" exception).
112. § 229.103, Instruction 5 (emphasis added). As observed with Item 101,
no release subsequent to the Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. No-Action Let-
ter, supra note 36, has expanded the disclosure language to include foreign pro-
ceedings. See supra notes 31-32, 35, 41, 45, 58 and accompanying text (quoting
SEC releases' language inclusive only of proceedings arising from federal, state
or local environmental provisions).
113. See MD&A Release, supra note 15, at 22,430 (describing two prong
test); 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1993); supra part I.C.3 (describing MD&A disclo-
sures); see also In re Caterpillar, Inc., supra note 87, at 63,054-55 (describing
MD&A disclosure as applied to foreign operations with material events).
114. See supra part I.C.4 (describing Regulation S-X).
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C. SEC DISCLOSURES AND WORLDMINE's COuTRY C SITE
WORLDMINE's third overseas site faces potentially signifi-
cant environmental regulation; however, Country C rarely pur-
sues enforcement. 115 Here, several complications arise. First,
as was the case with compliance costs in Country B,
WORLDMINE need not disclose its Country C compliance costs
because Item 101 does not apply to costs arising under foreign
provisions.11 6
Furthermore, Country C's non-enforcement complicates
WORLDMINE's determination as to whether that nation's
actions constitute a material proceeding under Item 103.
WORLDMINE must balance the low probability of enforcement
against the magnitude of the fines to determine materiality.117
WORLDMINE might conservatively estimate that these ex-
penditures will remain material despite the low risk of enforce-
ment.118 As with Country B's proceeding, however, WORLD-
115. See, e.g., P.R. Skelton, J., Enforcement-A New Zealand Perspective, in
ENvmoN.mNTAL LIAB=LIrY, supra note 20, at 263, 266-67 (describing New Zea-
land's Water Act as imposing fines up to NZ$150,000, and NZ$10,000 per day
for a continuing offense, but noting administrative reluctance to enforce such
regulations against major corporate taxpayers and judicial reluctance to grant
injunctions); John G. Taberner & Susan J. Gibb, Environmental Law of Austra-
Zia, in INTERNATIONAL ENvmoNmENTAL LAw AND REGULATION, supra note 100,
at Aus-1, §§ 3.2, 3.4 (discussing previous reluctance of Australian governments
to prosecute environmental offenses and increasingly stringent legislation in-
cluding $1 million civil fines and criminal penalties for violations); James
Brooke, Latin America's Oil Rush: Tapping Into Foreign Investors, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 11, 1993, § 3, at 5 (noting a trend in some Latin American countries to-
ward tightening lax enforcement of environmental laws); In Mexico, The Pollu-
tion Hurdle, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1993, at A2 (noting that although Mexico has
strong environmental laws, corruption and insufficient resources limit enforce-
ment); Richard Mooney, Survey of Aluminum, FIN. Tims, Oct. 28, 1992, at 34
(commenting that aluminum smelters in the former Soviet Union face no en-
forcement of environmental laws). See generally, Malcom Grant, Introduction,
in ENVmON~mNTAL LIABILITY, supra note 20, at 213, 213-18 (discussing gener-
ally the paradox between the implementation of strict environmental regula-
tions and the failures of enforcement).
116. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (1993); see also supra notes 101-107 and
accompanying text (discussing Country B compliance cost disclosures).
117. The hypothetical assumes Country C's fines are equivalent to those in
the United States.
118. That is, WORLDMINE might conclude that a reasonable investor
would consider this risk, however slight, "as having significantly altered the
'total mix of information made available." Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
232 (1988) (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976)); see also Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 517 (7th
Cir. 1989) (The anticipated magnitude... may be small even when the total
effect could be whopping.").
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MINE may then elect the Item 103 loophole and characterize
Country C's actions as exempt from disclosure.119
Alternatively, because Country C rarely enforces its regula-
tions, WORLDMINE could continue to risk noncompliance, hop-
ing never to incur the fines. WORLDMINE may then conclude
that Country C's proceedings are immaterial in light of the low
probability of enforcement relative to the proceeding's potential
magnitude. This second result ostensibly triggers Item 103's
broad mandate under Instruction 5(C) to disclose any environ-
mental proceeding to which a governmental agency is a party.120
Yet, Item 103's language excludes foreign proceedings from this
mandate. 121 Consequently, regardless of whether WORLD-
MINE characterizes Country C's proceedings as material or im-
material, Item 103's narrow language allows WORLDMINE to
characterize these proceedings as "ordinary routine litigation"
exempt from disclosure.
WORLDMINE encounters affirmative disclosure obliga-
tions under Item 303. If WORLDMINE determines that the
compliance costs and proceedings will occur, MD&A disclosure
is necessary. 122 If the company determines instead that neither
are "reasonably likely" to come to fruition, WORLDMINE must
consider both under the second prong of the MD&A test, and
assume that the compliance costs and fines will accrue. 123
Under this assumption, WORLDMINE must disclose both be-
cause each would have a material impact on business
operations.124
In its financial statements, WORLDMINE must disclose the
compliance costs and proceedings only if material. Prudence
suggests disclosure of the compliance costs, noting uncertainties
and recognizing the minimum amount of the expected range of
119. Instruction 5's abrogation of this exception extends only to proceedings
arising under federal, state, or local provisions. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1993).
120. See § 229.103, Instruction 5(C).
121. See § 229.103, Instruction 5(C) (including administrative or judicial
proceedings "arising under any Federal, State or local provisions") (emphasis
added); see also supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text (discussing Item
103's language exclusion as applied to Country B's proceeding).
122. This result is pursuant to the first prong of the MD&A test, see MD&A
Release, supra note 15, at 22,430, under the hypothetical's assumptions that
Country C's environmental provisions are substantively equivalent to those in
the United States.
123. See MD&A Release, supra note 15, at 22,430.
124. See id.
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compliance expenditures. 125 In contrast, observing Country C's
lax enforcement, WORLDMINE may generate a zero value for
its minimum estimate of liabilities stemming from proceedings,
ostensibly obviating the disclosure requirement as applied to
those proceedings.1 26
D. SEC DIsCLOSURES AND WORLDMINE's CoumTRYD SiTE
The combination of lax enforcement and nominal fines char-
acterizing Country D's environmental regime127 adds further
wrinkles to WORLDMINE's disclosures. The ambiguous man-
date to disclose Country D compliance costs pursuant to Item
101 parallels that of Countries B and C.128 Whereas WORLD-
MINE encountered additional ambiguity under Item 103 con-
cerning the materiality of Country C's proceedings, because
Country D rarely pursues enforcement and then imposes only
nominal fines in its proceedings, such proceedings are not mate-
rial, and WORLDMINE need not make any disclosure.129
Under Item 303 analysis, WORLDMINE's compliance costs
and proceedings in Country D fail to meet the first prong of the
MD&A disclosure test. It is not "reasonably likely" that these
compliance costs or proceedings will come to fruition.' 30 In con-
trast to Country C, however, under the second prong-assuming
the compliance costs and fines accrue-WORLDMINE must dis-
close compliance costs, which would have a material impact on
business operations, but not the proceeding, which imposes only
a nominal penalty.131 Analysis under Regulation S-X concern-
125. See StaffAccounting Bulletin, supra note 15, at 64,283 (permitting dis-
closure of minimum estimates); see also supra part I.C.4 (discussing financial
statement disclosures).
126. See Staff Accounting Bulletin, supra note 15, at 64,283 (permitting
minimum estimate disclosure).
127. See, e.g., John Otis, Pollution, Illness Blamed on Banana Crop Pesti-
cides, WASH. Tnms, Sept. 15, 1992, § A, at 10 (criticizing weak and unenforced
environmental laws in Honduras); Trade Counseling Office in Singapore Opens
Under U.S. lAsia Environment Program, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at
1494 (Sept. 8, 1993) (noting Indonesia's weak environmental laws and low
enforcement).
128. See supra notes 101-107 and accompanying text; supra text accompa-
nying note 116 (discussing Countries B and C Item 101 disclosures).
129. Due to the language exclusion, Country D proceedings, like non-mate-
rial proceedings in Country C, see supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text,
sit outside the ambit of Instruction 5's mandate to disclose environmental
proceedings.
130. See MD&A Release, supra note 15, at 22,430; see also supra part I.C.3
(discussing MD&A test).
131. See id.
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ing WORLDMINE's financial statement reporting is identical to
that for the Country C site: disclosure of compliance costs, but
not proceedings.1 32
E. SEC DISCLOSURES AND WORLDMINE's COuNTRYE SITE
Because WORLDMINE operates its Country E site in an en-
vironmental regulatory void,133 no disclosure obligations arise.
No Item 101 obligations accrue because Country E imposes no
regulation with which WORLDMINE must comply. Similarly,
no regulation exists to give rise to any proceedings for disclosure
pursuant to Item 103. That WORLDMIE expects no expendi-
tures or proceedings to occur obviates MD&A reporting.134 The
same factors release WORLDMINE from any obligation to re-
port on its Country E site in its financial statements.1 35
III. EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY FAILURES IN THE SEC'S
DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS
As shown in Table 1, the foregoing analysis of WORLD-
MINE's environmental disclosure burden teases out several
weaknesses in the SEC's current regulatory scheme as applied
to extraterritorial environmental matters. Two broad criticisms
emerge: the regulatory language is inconsistent and underinclu-
sive, and political realities complicate materiality determina-
tions of overseas environmental matters. Underlying these
criticisms are considerations of equity and efficiency predicated
on striking a balance between investors' interests and the regis-
trant's disclosure burden.
132. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text (discussing Country C
financial statement disclosures).
133. See, e.g., Joseph LaDou, Deadly Migration: Hazardous Industries'
Flight to the Third World, TECH. REV., July 1991, at 46 (discussing the environ-
mental impact of a shift of manufacturing operations to ill-prepared developing
nations that have either no environmental regulations or little power to enforce
those that are on the books).
134. The MD&A's forward-looking emphasis might impose an obligation on
WORLDMINE to assume, under the second prong of the MD&A test, that
Country E will implement an environmental regime. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.303(a), Instruction 11 (1993) (requiring foreign registrants to assess the
material impact of overseas governmental, economic or political matters);
MD&A Release, supra note 15, at 22,430 (giving an example wherein a regis-
trant must disclose the material effects of possible regulations promulgated
pursuant to recently enacted legislation). Such an interpretation, however,
would require WORLDMINE to determine the scope of the new provisions, the
penalties imposed, and the likelihood of enforcement, and then calculate
whether a material effect would occur.
135. See supra part I.C.4 (discussing Regulation S-X).
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A. LANGUAGE FAILURES IN THE SEC's ENVIRoNmNTAL
DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS
Table 1 shows that Item 303 and Regulation S-X obligate
WORLDMINE to disclose its material compliance costs and pro-
ceedings in almost every country. In contrast, Item 101's lan-
guage permits the nondisclosure of compliance costs in
Countries B, C and D. 136 This inconsistency undermines the in-
structive value of the regulations and arguably obfuscates regis-
trants' disclosure obligations. Moreover, that Item 101 permits
one corporation to withhold information concerning material en-
vironmental expenditures at an extraterritorial site, but obli-
gates another corporation to disclose identical expenditures at
its site in the United States, is inequitable. No policy basis ex-
ists for placing such disparate disclosure burdens upon regis-
trants when, as in the hypothetical, the costs associated with
two identical sites wield arguably equivalent material effects
upon business operations.
The exclusionary language in Item 103 appears similarly in-
consistent with Item 303 and Regulation S-X. Instruction 5 nul-
lifies Item 103's "ordinary routine litigation" disclosure
exception only for proceedings arising out of federal, state, and
local environmental provisions. Hence, this loophole remains
for any extraterritorial proceeding brought by a non-U.S.-based
regulatory agency, regardless of materiality.137
To permit such inequitable disclosure obligations under-
mines the SEC's traditional policy goals: the protection of inves-
tors and the furtherance of fair, ordinary, and informed
markets. 138 Investors cannot make fully informed comparisons
when corporations with identical material compliance expendi-
136. See supra notes 101-107 and accompanying text; supra text accompa-
nying notes 116, 128 (describing Item 101(c)(xii)'s exclusionary language in the
context of Country B, C and D disclosure obligations).
Item 101(d), mandating the reporting of "any risks" inherent to foreign op-
erations, likewise suffers from poor drafting. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(d) (1993).
That registrants must report on any foreign risks, regardless of materiality,
imposes an enormous disclosure burden and is subject to abuse; registrants
may choose to obfuscate important overseas risks with lengthy discussions on
immaterial risks. Cf Disclosure of Environmental Proceedings, supra note 23,
at 84,287 (recognizing that registrants obscured significant environmental pro-
ceedings with lengthy descriptions of relatively inconsequential proceedings
and that volume of disclosure materials interfered with and complicated inves-
tor and administrative review of business operations).
137. See supra notes 112, 119-121 and accompanying text (discussing
WORLDMINE's use of Item 103's "ordinary routine litigation" loophole in
Countries B and C).
138. See Proposed Environmental Disclosures, supra note 22, at 85,713.
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tures or contingent proceedings liabilities pursue different dis-
closure strategies, thereby presenting investors with disparate
and potentially misleading accounts of environmental liabilities
under Items 101 and 103. Thus, a U.S. firm having only domes-
tic operations, which faces a greater disclosure burden under
these Items, functions at a competitive disadvantage when seek-
ing to attract investors.13 9
B. AmBIGUITIES AND THE MATERuiTY STANDARD
The materiality standard requires that the registrant dis-
close any information that the reasonable investor would find
important to the "total mix" of information about a corpora-
tion.140 The analysis, however, of the hypothetical revealed un-
expected complexities when assessing the materiality of action
involving WORLDMINE's overseas sites.
First, lax enforcement by host countries creates indetermi-
nate disclosure obligations.' 4 1  Competing companies facing
similar overseas proceedings could reach disparate conclusions
as to the likelihood of enforcement, and consequently the mate-
riality of compliance expenditures or proceedings, thus the po-
tential creating for inconsistent reporting among companies.' 42
Such inconsistencies severely undermine the usefulness in com-
paring disclosure information for investment purposes.
In addition, operations in a weak or evolving environmental
regime' 43 face additional uncertainties that complicate materi-
139. Based solely upon information presented in corporate filings, investors
will choose to invest in the registrant with sites overseas (in Countries B, C, D
or E, for example) for which no disclosure is made, rather than investing in the
registrant that is required to disclose liabilities accruing to its U.S. site.
140. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC In-
dus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
141. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text (discussing alternative
materiality conclusions due to lax enforcement).
142. In addition, the indefinite materiality of proceedings due to lax enforce-
ment may lead to different financial statement disclosures under Regulation S-
X, as observed with WORLDMINE's nondisclosure of proceedings in Countries
C and D. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text; supra text accompa-
nying note 132.
143. In recent years, environmental regulatory development throughout the
world has proceeded at a rapid pace. See G. Nelson Smith, III, A Comparative
Analysis of European and American Environmental Laws: Their Effects on In-
ternational Blue Chip Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, 14 HASTiNGs INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 573, 574-75, 588 (1991) (noting that European environmental
laws are 10 years behind U.S. laws and that many, including hazardous waste
laws, are in rudimentary form); G. Nelson Smith, III, The Real Challenge to the
Polish Revolution: Cleaning the Polish Environment Through Privatization and
Preventive Market-Based Incentives, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 553 (1992) (outlining
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ality assessments. If, in the hypothetical, Countries C or D im-
proves enforcement, or Country D increases its fines imposed for
violations, or Country E implements environmental laws, these
considerations might lead WORLDMINE to make broader dis-
closures concerning its sites in those countries. Indeed, under
the second prong of the MD&A test and in light of the SEC's
recent enforcement action against Caterpillar, Item 303 may re-
quire a registrant to hypothecate such overseas events and esti-
mate their effect on a company's business operations.144 In so
doing, however, the SEC places a heavy burden on those regis-
trants less able to make such forward-looking evaluations of a
particular nation's political and environmental regulatory
development.1 45
changes necessary in Poland's environmental legal structure and proposing re-
forms); Donald W. Stever, Environmental Law of the Czech and Slovak Federa-
tive Republic, in INTERNATIONAL ENvmoNmiENTAL LAw AND REGULATION, supra
note 100, at Czech-i, § 2.3 (characterizing Czech and Slovak air pollution con-
trol strategy as rudimentary, but undergoing rapid change).
144. See In re Caterpillar, Inc., supra note 87, at 63,055.
145. The SEC's primary emphasis on the economic determinants of materi-
ality is defensible on two grounds. First, despite NEPA's mandate to consider
environmental protection, the SEC is not the proper organ to alter corporate
environmental behavior. Cf Rulemaking on Environmental Disclosure, supra
note 39, at 86,292 (The Commission cannot, itself, undertake to regulate corpo-
rate conduct which affects the environment.") Moreover, the problem of un-
checked exploitation of the local environment rests not with corporate conduct
but instead with the foreign nation's environmental regulatory regime. Improv-
ing this regime to impose material burdens for environmental liabilities will
concomitantly force corporations in violation of those regulations to make ap-
propriate disclosures and thereby modify corporate behavior. Cf Wallace,
supra note 76, at 1125-28 (discussing a market-oriented approach to environ-
mental law compliance). It is inefficient to pursue such improvements through
the use of U.S. securities disclosure laws. Instead, the more efficient solution is
to modify the regime through direct diplomatic activity, see Exec. Order No.
12,114, supra note 20, § 2-2, or the imposition of sanctions through interna-
tional environmental laws, see Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete
the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550, art. 4 (entered into force, Jan.
1, 1989) (imposing trade sanctions against countries exporting products con-
taining or produced with banned or controlled substances).
In addition, in light of the SEC's mandate to protect investor's interests
through the disclosure of economically relevant information, that environmen-
tal hazards in a regulatory void (such as in Country E) pose no material eco-
nomic threat to business operations obviates disclosure.
1994] 1073
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1045
IV. PROPOSALS TO REFORM SEC ENVIRONMENTAL
DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS TO
ACCOMMODATE EXTRATERRITORIAL
ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS
Based on the criticisms outlined in Part III, the proposals
for reforming SEC environmental disclosure regulations are
twofold. This Note recommends that the SEC modify the cur-
rent language in Items 101 and 103, and take additional admin-
istrative actions.
A. LANGUAGE MODIFICATIONS
The SEC should, pursuant to its broad authority under the
1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,146
propose and execute regulatory language modifications. Specifi-
cally, the Commission should amend both Item 101 and Item
103 to reflect disclosure obligations concerning federal, state, lo-
cal, and foreign environmental provisions. Item 101's amend-
ment effectively codifies the SEC's position in its 1973 No-Action
letter to Air Products, requiring the disclosure of any foreign en-
vironmental provision having a material impact on a company's
financial condition or business, and is consistent with a regis-
trant's obligations under Item 303.147
Item 103's language modification would also codify the
SEC's intent in 1973 to maintain an economically material
threshold for the disclosure of foreign environmental proceed-
146. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (describing SEC's regula-
tory authority).
147. See Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., supra note 36, at 83,229; supra
note 136 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistency between Item 303
and Items 103 and 103). The language of Item 101(c)(xii) should read, in perti-
nent part:
Appropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the material effects
that compliance with Federal, State, local, and foreign provisions
which have been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of mater-
ials into the environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the
environment, may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings and
competitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries.
Cf 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (1993) (emphasis added).
In addition, the SEC should modify the language of Item 101(d)(2) to re-
quire the disclosure of "[a]ny material risks attendant" to a registrant's foreign
operations. Cf. § 229.101(d)(2). Under this modification, the registrant would
then necessarily balance "both the indicated probability that the event will oc-
cur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the
company activity." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see supra note 136 (criticizing
Item 101(d)'s current language).
1074
1994] ENWIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURES 1075
ings to which a government is a party.1 48 Extending Instruction
5(c) to encompass all proceedings, except those below the
$100,000 floor,149 would prevent registrants from obscuring de-
scriptions of substantial foreign proceedings with information on
insignificant foreign proceedings. 150 The proposed modification
would obligate the registrant to make equivalent proceedings
disclosures regardless of domestic or foreign origin.1 5 '
Absent such modifications, both Items impose a lighter en-
vironmental disclosure burden to corporations with extraterrito-
rial sites as compared to corporations with U.S. sites. This
inequitable treatment results in disparate environmental re-
porting-by corporations facing essentially equivalent material
compliance costs or proceedings expenditures-which violates
148. See Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., supra note 36, at 83,229. Item
103, Instruction 5 should then read, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an administrative or judicial proceed-
ing (including, for purposes of A and B of this Instruction, proceedings
which present in large degree the same issues) arising under any Fed-
eral, State, local, or foreign provisions that have been enacted or
adopted regulating the discharge of materials into the environment or
primarily for the purpose of protecting the environment shall not be
deemed "ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business" and
shall be described if:
A. Such proceeding is material to the business or financial condi-
tion of the registrant;
B. Such proceeding involves primarily a claim for damages, or in-
volves potential monetary sanctions, capital expenditures, deferred
charges or charges to income and the amount involved, exclusive of
interest and costs, exceeds 10 percent of the current assets of the regis-
trant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis; or
C. A governmental authority is a party to such proceeding and
such proceeding involves potential monetary sanctions, unless the reg-
istrant reasonably believes that such proceeding will result in no mon-
etary sanctions, or in monetary sanctions, exclusive of interest and
costs, of less than $100,000; provided, however, that such proceedings
which are similar in nature may be grouped and described generically.
Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1993) (emphasis added).
149. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, Instruction 5(C) (1993).
150. See Disclosure of Environmental Proceedings, supra note 23, at 84,287-
89 (discussing policy behind the $100,000 disclosure threshold to permit the
omission from disclosure of immaterial governmental proceedings which, based
on the registrant's reasonable belief, will result in inconsequential fines).
151. The SEC promoted the broad disclosure of domestic environmental pro-
ceedings, arguing that anytime that a governmental agency brings an action it
must be predicated on the perception of a serious violation. See Rulemaking on
Environmental Disclosure, supra note 39, at 86,295 (arguing that environmen-
tal violations which the responsible authority considers significant result in
proceedings or litigation). This rationale applies equally to overseas proceed-
ings. That a foreign governmental agency commences a proceeding against a
registrant reflects that governmental agency's perception that the registrant
has committed a significant violation.
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the SEC's stated policy designed to protect the investors' inter-
ests and require disclosure of relevant economic information. 152
B. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
The second set of proposals requires that the SEC under-
take two administrative actions. First, the Commission should
issue an interpretive release addressing the complexities re-
garding materiality determinations for extraterritorial environ-
mental matters. Under the MD&A's two-prong test, registrants
with material environmental matters in an environmental re-
gime with lax enforcement face equivalent disclosure burdens to
those borne by registrants in nations enforcing such regula-
tions. 153 The proper application, however, of the MD&A test to
environmental matters in countries with evolving or no environ-
mental regimes, like Countries D and E, is unclear. Given the
SEC's emphasis on forward-looking disclosures, the Commission
should discuss the extent to which a registrant must predict
whether future environmental regulations will have a material
effect on business operations.
To this end, the SEC's safe harbor provisions provide some
guidance.-54 If a registrant reasonably believes, or states in
good faith, that a nation's environmental regime will remain
weak or nonexistent, no obligatory disclosure arises. 155 The safe
harbor provisions therefore protect the registrant from liability
based on the inaccuracy of forward-looking predictions concern-
ing changes in a foreign nation's environmental regime when
152. See Proposed Environmental Disclosures, supra note 22, at 85,713; see
also supra notes 21-23, 43 and accompanying text (describing SEC policy to
protect investors' interests).
153. Compare MD&A compliance costs disclosures among Countries A
through D, supra Table 1.
154. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing safe harbor provi-
sions); see also Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 512-16 (7th
Cir. 1989). In Wielgos, Judge Easterbrook offers an illuminating discussion of
the safe harbor provisions under 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1993). Wielgos, 892 F.2d
at 512-16. In affirming the lower court's holding that Commonwealth Edison
held a reasonable belief as to the accuracy of cost estimates and operational
dates for several nuclear power plants, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the
court, stated, "[florward-looking statements need not be correct; it is enough
that they have a reasonable basis." Id. at 513.
155. See supra notes 130-131, 134 and accompanying text (discussing non-
disclosure of environmental matters in Countries D and E pursuant to the
MD&A test).
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such predictions are made in good faith or upon reasonable
belief.1 56
Furthermore, to improve the efficiency of its review of regis-
trants' overseas environmental disclosures, 57 the SEC should
further broaden its relationship with the EPA to include the
transmission of information on foreign environmental laws.' 58
The addition of these assessments to the pool of information
available to investors and registrants generates several bene-
fits.' 5 9 Registrants' access to the EPA's assessments of foreign
environmental regimes may partially alleviate any increased
disclosure burden, 60 thereby improving the efficiency of regis-
trants' disclosure efforts. Moreover, universal access to such in-
formation fosters equity in that no advantage will accrue to, nor
disadvantage registrants who have disparate capacities to as-
sess foreign laws and the materiality of environmental matters
thereunder.' 6 '
156. See Wielgos, 892 F.2d at 514 ("Inevitable inaccuracy of a projection does
not eliminate the safe harbor, however."). The assessment of "reasonable be-
lief' and "good faith" is highly fact specific. See id. at 515-16 (discussing facts,
including other unpublished projections, which reflect upon the "reasonable ba-
sis" and "good faith" of published projections).
157. The SEC recently confirmed that it scrutinizes forward-looking MD&A
disclosures of material foreign matters. See In re Caterpillar, Inc., supra note
87, at 63,055.
158. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the nascent SEC-
EPA dialogue). Such information might include assessments of enforcement
and quantification of penalties for noncompliance in other nations. Indeed, in
1979 President Carter ordered that the State Department, Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ), and other interested federal agencies exchange informa-
tion on environmental matters with foreign nations. Exec. Order No. 12,114,
supra note 20, at § 2-2. In light of Congress's recent efforts to dissolve CEQ, see
H.R. 3512, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), the EPA is a logical successor to this
task; see also Rulemaking on Environmental Disclosures, supra note 39, at
86,295 n.16 (discussing conversations with environmental agencies to coordi-
nate and formulate reporting standards).
159. See Wielgos, 892 F.2d at 514 (stating that the addition of information
and analysis to that already assembled improves the accuracy of the collective
assessment, "even though a given projection will be off the mark").
160. Although a registrant's disclosure burden will likely increase as it as-
sesses the effects of foreign compliance costs and proceedings on its operations,
the extent of this increase is unclear. Many companies currently collect envi-
ronmental data through environmental audits and disclose the results to inves-
tors in environmental reports. KPMG PEAT MAR-Wvim, supra note 16, at 5, 14-
16, 19. The individual corporation may choose to supplement its audits with or
rely upon the EPA's assessments, thereby reducing the need to expend re-
sources to track foreign environmental legislation.
161. See Proposed Environmental Disclosure, supra note 22, at 85,713
(describing traditional objectives of securities disclosures); see also Rulemaking
on Environmental Disclosures, supra note 39, at 86,295 (expressing concern
that, if permitted to evaluate the significance of noncompliance with environ-
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CONCLUSION
Analysis of the introductory hypothetical pursuant to the
SEC's current environmental disclosure regulations evinces am-
biguities and loopholes under which, other things being equal,
U.S. corporations with overseas operations ostensibly face a
weaker disclosure mandate than do businesses with domestic
operations. In light of the potential magnitude of environmental
liabilities, this result leaves investors unable to make reliable
comparisons of the liabilities accruing to companies with domes-
tic and overseas operations, thereby violating this fundamental
objective of federal securities laws.
The remedy is twofold. First, the SEC should rewrite those
regulations explicitly addressing environmental matters to ex-
tend disclosure obligations to include material compliance costs
and proceedings arising under foreign environmental laws. In
addition, the SEC should issue an interpretive release clarifying
registrants' forward-looking reporting obligations with respect
to weak and evolving foreign environmental regimes. Ex-
panding the SEC's nascent dialogue with the EPA to include the
exchange of information on foreign environmental laws will fa-
cilitate the Commission's evaluation of registrants' environmen-
tal disclosures and afford registrants access to standardized
evaluations of such laws.
mental regulations, registrants would submit reports that permitted little or no
effective comparison between registrants for investment purposes).
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